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Summary
Despite cultural and individual variation, humans are a judg-
mental bunch [1]. There is accumulating evidence for early
social and moral evaluation as shown by research with in-
fants and children documenting the notion that some behav-
iors are perceived as right and others are perceived aswrong
[2]. Moreover, social interactions are governed by a concern
for fairness and others’ well-being [3, 4]. However, although
generosity increases between infancy and late childhood, it
is less clear what mechanisms guide this change [5]. Early
predispositions toward prosociality are thought to arise in
concert with the social and cultural environment, developing
into adult morality, a complex incorporation of emotional,
motivational, and cognitive processes [6, 7]. Using EEG
combined with eye tracking and behavioral sharing, we
investigated, for the first time, the temporal neurodynamics
of implicit moral evaluation in 3- to 5-year-old children.
Results show distinct early automatic attentional (EPN)
and later cognitively controlled (N2, LPP) patterns of neural
response while viewing characters engaging in helping
and harming behaviors. Importantly, later (LPP), but not
early (EPN), waveforms predicted actual generosity. These
results shed light on theories of moral development by
documenting the respective contribution of automatic and
cognitive neural processes underpinning social evaluation
and directly link these neural computations to prosocial
behavior in children.
Results
Although infants appear sensitive to inequality [8], and tod-
dlers can act prosocially [4], fairness in actual behavior does
not appear to develop until late childhood, when children’s
sharing approaches equality in distribution [5]. However,
although there is considerable change in expressed sharing
behavior between infancy and late childhood, it is less clear
what mechanisms guide this increase in generosity. For
instance, studies with adults suggest that fast, intuitive, and
automatic processes underlie cooperation and contribution
[9]. Yet, expression of generosity in late childhood has been
theorized to be dependent upon secondary considerations,
such as cognitive concerns with actually being fair as well as
appearing fair [10]. Taken together, both automatic and
controlled computations seem to play a role in moral judgment
and subsequent moral behavior.
To examine how specific neurodynamic responses are
associated with implicit moral evaluations of antisocial (harm-
ing) and prosocial (helping) behaviors in young children and
whether early automatic or later cognitive controlled pro-
cesses are predictive of their generosity, we collected electro-
encephalogram (EEG), eye-tracking, and behavioral measures
(Figure 1). It was predicted that all children would show neural
differentiation in earlier waveforms related to automatic pro-
cessing; specifically, the amplitude of the early posterior nega-
tivity (EPN) waveform was expected to differ when viewing
helping scenes compared to harming scenarios. Additionally,
it was expected that children would exhibit differential ampli-
tudes in later waveforms associated with cognitive detection
of conflict and cognitive reappraisal of the stimuli (N2, late pos-
itive potential [LPP]). For the N2, children were expected to
view harmful scenes in conflict with established moral rules
and thus exhibit a greater negativity when perceiving harmful
versus helping scenes. Children were also expected to show
differential amplitudes for helping compared to harming sce-
narios for the LPP [11]. Finally, if prosocial behavior (sharing)
is primarily facilitated by automatic reactivity or attention-
based processes, then EPN differences are anticipated to
predict explicit sharing in children. Conversely, if generosity
is guided by controlled processes, then differences in later
waveforms (LPP) would predict giving behavior.
Significant differences were found in early automatic and
later controlled temporal periods when children viewed the
morally laden scenarios. Primarily, results from a 3 (Pz, P3,
P4) 3 2 (helping/harming) ANOVA showed a significant
main effect of moral valence (helping/harming) in EPN
mean amplitude (F(1, 47) = 4.7, p = 0.036, h2 = 0.090). This
difference was characterized by greater mean amplitudes
(greater negativities) for positive (helping) versus negative
(harming) scenes.
Moreover, later distinct modulations were observed in the
N2 and LPP. For the N2, results from a 3 (Fz, F3, F4)3 2 (help-
ing/harming) ANOVA showed a significant main effect of moral
valence (helping/harming) in N2 mean amplitude (F(1, 47) =
8.930, p = 0.005, h2 = 0.165). As expected, the mean amplitude
in response to viewing harming scenes was significantly more
negative than the mean amplitude of viewing helping scenes.
Finally, a midline LPP difference was detected in the window
of 380–600 ms after stimulus presentation. Results from a 3
(Fz, Cz, Pz) 3 2 (helping/harming) ANOVA revealed a signifi-
cant main effect of moral valence (helping/harming) in LPP
mean amplitude (F(1, 47) = 6.2, p = 0.02, h2 = 0.110). As ex-
pected, given the reference schematic, a significant effect
of electrode was also observed for LPP mean amplitude
(F(2, 46) = 11.87, p < 0.001, h2 = 0.479; see Figure 2 for a layout
of the temporal waveforms, as well as their scalp distri-
butions). Given the small age range of the current sample
(3–5 years), as expected, no age-related changes were
observed for any of the event-related potential (ERP) differ-
ences, either early or late. Results from a paired-sample t
test of power density in the 5–8 Hz range during the viewing
of harming versus helping scenes failed to show a group-level
difference (t(45) = 2.647, nonsignificant [ns]) and remained
nonsignificant after accounting for age-related changes
(F(1,44) = 0.119, ns). Additionally, a paired-sample t test
also failed to show differences in visual fixation percentage
(from eye tracking) for bad and good scenes (t(45) = 1.32, ns).*Correspondence: decety@uchicago.edu
Sharing Behavior
Children shared an average of 1.78 out of 10 stickers with an
anonymous other child (SD = 2.35), which is slightly less than
preschoolers in previous studies using the dictator game, in
which children shared nearly 2.5 out of 10 rewards [12]. There
were no significant differences in sharing behavior by gender
(F(1, 47) = 2.8, ns), and age in months was not a significant
predictor of sharing (r = 2.04, ns).
Brain-Sharing Behavior Relationship
To assess whether early automatic or later controlled neural
computations associated with the processing of viewing help-
ing and harming scenes predicted actual generosity, we calcu-
lated difference scores for parietal (P3, Pz, P4) electrodes for
the EPN and central and frontal (Cz, F3, Fz, F4) sites for the
N2 and LPP by subtracting the mean amplitude of the signal
for harming scenes from the mean amplitude of the signal for
helping scenes during these time periods. Individual differ-
ences in these sites were then related to sharing in the dictator
game. Individual differences in early automatic processing
(EPN) of harming and helping were not predictive of explicit
sharing. Additionally, generosity was not related to changes
in the N2 waveform, global 5–8 Hz power density for helping
and harming, or visual fixation percentage. However, temporal
dynamics associated with later controlled cognitive reap-
praisal of helping versus harming (LPP differences at left fron-
tal sites) were significantly predictive of sharing (F3: r = 0.33,
p = 0.022). This relation was particularly strong when only chil-
dren who had chosen to share any resources were included in
the analysis (n = 20) (F3: r = 0.49, p = 0.029) (see Figure 3).
Discussion
Social and moral evaluations play a key role in motivating
prosociality, guiding our preferences, and shaping our deci-
sions and behaviors when living in complex social groups.
Developmental neuroscience studies are critical to inform
theoretical debates about the nature of the mechanisms
Figure 1. Examples of Stimuli
The Chicago moral sensitivity task (CMST) con-
sists of short scenarios depicting two cartoon
characters engaging in either intentional harm
(see top row for examples) or intentional help
(see bottom row for examples). Red arrows
denote the onset of ERP time locking.
underlying moral evaluations and be-
havior and, in particular, the respective
contribution of automatic and controlled
processes [13]. Indeed, most of the
theoretical views of moral evaluation
in adults indicate that it stems from
a complex integration of both early auto-
matic and later controlled components
[14]. While burgeoning behavioral evi-
dence in adults suggests the primary
role of automatic processing in generos-
ity [9], in developmental investigations,
later controlled mechanisms, including
cognitive reappraisal or saliency pro-
cessing, play a greater role [10]. Neu-
roscience research is thus critical in
clarifying the nature of the computational systems, which
mediate early social evaluations and behaviors, often consid-
ered a prerequisite for moral thought. However, due to the
methodological constraints of most neuroimaging methods,
few neuroscience studies have investigated moral evaluation
[13, 15] or prosocial behavior in very young children [16].
Consistently, several time-locked neural responses in in-
fants and children have been associated with early visual
differentiation of stimuli and relatively automatic attentional
or emotional responding (EPN) [17]), as well as temporally later
waveforms that index conflict detection in processing of stim-
uli (N2) [18] and cognitive reappraisal, top-down regulation, or
saliency processing (LPP) [19, 20]). Each of these waveforms
can serve as a proxy for domain-general mechanisms of
automatic and controlled processing in the developing brain.
The results of the current study provide the first evidence
that in young children, neural computations involved in both
early automatic and later controlled processes build to form
implicit moral evaluations, but only neural differences indexing
the later controlled processes predict actual sharing behavior.
Previous work in adolescents and adults using EEG/ERP
indicate an early differentiation between scenarios depicting
helping and harming behaviors [11, 21, 22]. This early differen-
tiation relates temporally to the early posterior negativity
waveforms, often thought to index automatic visual process-
ing of affective stimuli [23]. Consistent with these results, in
the present study, modulations in temporal patterns were
observed between perceiving helping and harming scenes in
posterior areas for early automatic processes (between
100 ms and 175 ms after stimulus). Although source localiza-
tion cannot be reliably employed here given the number of
channels used in this study, it is worth noting that the EPN
modulations aremaximal over regions of the cortex where pre-
vious studies have precisely identified early neural responses
that distinguish intentional from accidental harmful actions
over the posterior superior temporal sulcus, a region that plays
a critical role in intention understanding and moral cognition
[11, 20, 21, 24, 25].
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In adolescent and adults studies of moral evaluation, middle
temporal differences have also been observed in the N2 when
perceiving moral scenarios. These differences have been in-
terpreted as reflecting attention allocation and cognitive con-
flict regarding the moral and affective content of these stimuli
[26, 27]. In our study with young children, midlatency temporal
differences over frontal sites were extremely significant (p <
0.01). These findings demonstrate, as expected from evidence
with infants [1, 28], that preschool-age children automatically
encode the emotional valence of moral stimuli and detect
conflict in harmful situations. Moreover, whereas the early
automatic component (EPN) was greater for the observation
of helping versus harming scenes, the waveform related to
cognitive conflict (N2) was greater (in negativity) for harming.
Moral scenarios elicit reliable LPP responses, which are
greater for positive social interactions than negative ones in
adult participants, and dispositional cognitive, but not
emotional, empathy predicted larger differences [11]. The later
controlled processes indexed by the LPP are argued to reflect
cognitive reappraisal of stimuli, top-down cognitive control,
and attentional reallocation to motivationally salient stimuli
[19, 20, 29]. In the present study, children’s LPP atmidline sites
was significantly modulated, wherein helping scenes elicited a
significantly more positive LPP than harming.
Importantly, individual differences in later waveforms (LPP)
predicted children’s explicit sharing behavior. This relation
was even more pronounced when limited to only the children
that shared at least one sticker. This fundamental brain-
behavior relationship clarifies the nature of the computational
mechanisms that link moral evaluation and sharing behavior
in children, specifically early automatic or later controlled. In
the present study, differences seen in specific online elec-
trophysiological components in response to morally laden
stimuli reliably predicted children’s own sharing behavior.
Notably, only the later controlled waveforms predicted
Figure 2. Spatiotemporal Neural Dynamics of
Moral Evaluations
On the left are grand averaged ERP waveforms
(1 s) at Pz, Fz, and Cz from 48 children when
viewing scenarios depicting harming (orange
lines) and helping (yellow lines), with positive
values plotted downward, consistent with pre-
vious practices in ERP reporting. EPN, N2, and
LPP differences are highlighted on relevant elec-
trodes. Additionally, scalp-topographic plots are
presented on the right for EPN, N2, and LPP.
sharing, suggesting the necessity of
cognitive reappraisal or regulation in
generosity and giving behaviors in
young children. While these findings
may contradict some behavioral results
in adults [9], they are in keeping with
one study with adults relating neural
modulation of later waveforms to pro-
social dispositions [26] and current
theories in developmental science [10].
One alternative interpretation of
these results would be that children
who exhibit greater attention to helping
versus harming scenarios in the Chicago
moral sensitivity task (CMST) are more
likely to share in the dictator game.
Analyses of both global 5–8 Hz frequency band during the
CMST (a frequency band thought to index attention to stimuli
in children) and eye tracking of visual fixation to the charac-
ters/action failed to show difference in attention between
helping and harming scenes. Moreover, individual differences
in the power density of the 5–8Hzband in childrenwhile viewing
helping or harming scenarios were not predictive of generosity,
nor were individual differences in visual fixation percentage to
actions. In sum, using two measures of attention to stimuli pro-
vided no evidence that global attention to either harming or
helping scenes drives the relation between LPP and generosity.
Taken together, the current study demonstrates how young
children exhibit automatic responses to morally laden stimuli
and reappraise these stimuli in a controlled manner. Thus,
children’s moral judgments are the result of an integration of
both early and automatic processing of helping and harming
scenarios and later cognitively controlled reappraisal of
these scenes. Importantly, the latter, but not the former, pre-
dicts actual sharing behavior. Finally, this investigation, by
combining developmental research on moral evaluation and
actual prosocial behavior with neuroscience methods, exem-
plifies the potential of such an integrative approach in refining
moral developmental controversies as advocated by Killen




Fifty-seven children between the ages of 3 and 5 years (m = 48.06 months,
SD = 6.35, 31 female) were recruited from a largemidwestern city. The study
was approved by the University of Chicago Institutional Review Board.
Procedure
Upon arrival, parents completed consent and basic demographics. Children
were acclimatized to the lab (the University of Chicago Child Neurosuite)
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and then brought to the EEG testing room. In the room, a 32-channel EEG
cap (EasyCap, Brain Products) was applied, and impedances were reduced
to less than 30 kOhms. Following impedance reduction, the CMST was
administered while eye tracking was continuously monitored to ensure
attentiveness. After EEG collection, children played a child-modified
dictator game.
The CMST
The CMST integrates aspects of the infant and toddler moral paradigms
into a neuroscience-friendly assessment. In the CMST, children watched
dynamic visual scenarios of characters intentionally performing either pro-
social acts (e.g., sharing food, helping another character after they fall) or
antisocial acts, predominately those where a character harms another
(e.g., hitting another character, pushing another character).
The CMST consisted of three-picture sequences depicting prosocial
behaviors and antisocial behaviors. These scenarios were validated with
an independent group of 40 children between the ages of 3 and 8 years,
and each scenario was classified as ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘bad.’’ Following the
presentation of the second picture in this validation study, children were
able to differentiate between the good and bad actions significantly better
than chance; thus, ERPs were time locked to the onset of the second
picture. The EEG version of the CMST included 140 trials of 3 s duration,
randomly presented, with a jittered intertrial interval of 500–1,500 ms
(Figure 1).
The Dictator Game
In this task [12], children were given ten rewards (stickers) andwere told that
the rewards were theirs to keep and that the experimenter could not give
any to an anonymous other child that would come to the lab later. Children
were then asked whether they wanted to give any of their resources to this
anonymous other child. Children had two boxes, one for themselves and
one for the other child. To prevent experimenter bias, the experimenter
turned around while the child decided how much to share, and the child
was instructed to voice their completion.
EEG/ERPs Collection and Data Analysis
Data were collected from a 32-channel active electrode system (acti-
CHamp, Brain Products) at 2 kHz, referenced to Cz, and all electrodes im-
pedances were kept below 30 kOhms. Electrophysiological data analysis
was performed using Brain Vision Analyzer software (Brain Products).
Data were downsampled offline (256 Hz) and rereferenced to the average
of all electrodes. Following rereferencing, EEG data were filtered using an
IIR filter of 1–30 Hz and a notch filter of 60 Hz. Artifact rejection was carried
out using a2200 mV to 200 mV threshold and visual inspection and rejection
by trained researchers. Gratton-Coles ocular artifact correction was
Figure 3. LPP Modulation Predicts Generosity
Individual differences in LPP modulation (mean
amplitude of helping scenarios versus mean
amplitude of harming scenarios) at electrode F3
predict differences in sharing (top: full sample
of 48 children; bottom: sample of 20 children
who shared at least one sticker).
performed on EEG data to identify and correct
ocular movements, seeded off electrode Fp1
[31]. Following basic EEG preprocessing, data
were segmented according to stimulus type
(harming/helping). Epochs were created with
200 ms baselines and 1,000 ms stimulus presen-
tation following the onset of the second stimulus
frame. Epochs were averaged by trial type and
were baseline corrected. Corrected averages
per individual were combined for a grand
average per individual and ERPs were analyzed
across subjects by trial types. Due to exhaus-
tion, not all participants completed 140 trials
of the CMST. Only children who had at least 20
artifact-free trials for each condition (harming
and helping) were included in the grand average
and further analyses (n = 48). An average of 61
artifact-free trials was included in the harming
scenes, and 57 artifact-free trials were included in the helping scenes.
From the grand average, three time periods of interest were defined that
relate to consistent ERP waveforms: EPN (100–175 ms), N2 (290–375 ms),
and LPP (380–600 ms). For the EPN, mean amplitude between 100 ms
and 175 ms was extracted for three midline and lateralized posterior elec-
trodes (10–20 coordinates: P3, Pz, P4), and for the N2, mean amplitude be-
tween 290 ms and 375 ms from the three frontal electrodes (F3, Fz, F4) was
calculated. Finally, for the LPP, mean amplitude from midline electrodes
(Fz, Cz, Pz) was used. In all comparisons, a 3 (electrode)3 2 (helping/harm-
ing) repeated-measures ANOVA examined differences in mean amplitude
on the grand average waveforms for each time window. Where appropriate,
the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied for violations of sphericity.
For brain-behavioral analysis, difference waves (helping scenes/harming
scenes) were calculated for the EPN, N2, and LPP waveforms at frontal
(F3, Fz, F4) and midline (Cz, Pz) electrodes. These difference waves were
then subjected to a correlation analysis to determine their relation to
sharing behaviors.
Additionally, spectral analyses of the 5–8 Hz frequency band were
analyzed for good and bad scenarios. In spectral analyses, following the
basic preprocessing stream described above, scenes were segmented
into 500 ms epochs with 50% overlap. A fast Fourier transformation
(FFT) was then applied to each epoch. FFTs for each epoch and all 32
electrodes were averaged, and power density in the 5–8 Hz range was
extracted.
Eye-Tracking Analyses
Eye-tracking data were collected during the CMST with a SensoMotoric
Instruments (SMI) RED-m (60 Hz), and participants were located w60 cm
from the screen. Data processing was performed in SMI BeGaze software.
All fixations less than 80 ms or dispersions greater than 100 pixels were
eliminated. Areas of interest (AOIs) were defined around the characters of
interest (subtending w27 degrees of visual angle, extending w6 degrees
beyond the character in all directions). Fixation duration for each AOI was
extracted and averaged based on content (good or bad action). Percent
fixation on AOI was calculated by dividing the fixation duration by the
duration of the trial.
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